Miranda v. Arizona Case Analysis Essay

In Miranda, the Court held that, if the person being intergoated indicates in any maner that they want a lawyer, the interigation must stop.  Furthermore, in the Court’s progeny, the Court has declared that Miranda, is a “ rigid rule.”   However, the court has blatantly ignored its own precedent in this case. As a result, I must respectfully dissent because the precedent is being missaplied and stare decisis is being ignored. 

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal case.”   This Court's jurisprudence and progeny has interpreted this amendment to mean that a confession that is" voluntary and freely given is admissible so long as the confession is not extracted using threats or violence, nor obtained using any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exercise of any improper influence.”  

The Government may not use any statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the accused unless procedural safeguards were used, and the Government can demonstrate the use of these safeguards.  In Miranda, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires the Government to warn before questioning any person in custody or any person whose freedom is significantly restricted   These warnings include: (1) the person must be informed that they have the right to remain silent; (2) any statement made can be used against them in a court of law; (3) they have a right to have an attorney present during questioning either appointed or retained.  The Court dictates that these rights can be waived so long as the waiver is  done intelligently, voluntarily, and knowingly.  Lastly, the Court pronounces that if the person in custodial interrogation indicates in any manner and at any stage that the person wishes to speak to an attorney, all questioning must stop until the person consents to be questioned or reinitiates the conversation.  Thus, cases like Edwards and this present case are inconsistent with the rule clearly articulated in Miranda..  

Furthermore, if the person is alone and does not want to be questioned, the Government cannot question the person.  The majority justifies this rule because of an ancient study, knowns as the Wickersham report,  that stood for the proposition that police were beating confessions out of suspects and using different tactics to force people to confess.  However, the majority admits that this is not the norm but rather the exception. 

It is a violation of Miranda not to provide counsel when an accused has clearly requested an attorney.  In Edwards, he was arrested  , the police Mirandized the defendant and stated that another person implicated the defendant in the crime. The defendant denied involvement and made a statement on tape. After making a statement on tape, he asked to cut a deal. The officer explained that he could not negotiate a deal. The defendant then stated, "I want a lawyer before making a deal.”   Questioning the defendant stopped, and he was taken to jail. The following day the same police officers went to question the defendant again. The defendant stated that he did not want to talk to anyone. The correctional officer told the defendant that he was required to talk.  The defendant implicated himself and was convicted. The Court held that once a defendant in custodial interrogation clearly asserted his right to counsel, the interrogation must stop as previously held in Miranda. 

In Fare, a juvenile was accused of murder during a home robbery.  During interrogation at the police station, the juvenile requested his probation officer.  This Court held that a probation officer is not in the same position as an attorney. Therefore, there was no request for an attorney, and the incriminating statements the juvenile made were admissible.  However, in Fare, this Court "fashioned in Miranda the rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring all interrogation to cease. " In case the majority does not know, rigid means it is strictly observed and cannot be changed. 

I now turn to my first point. The Court, in this case, fails to correctly apply the precedent because Miranda clearly  stated that any indiciaton of wanting a lawyer is good enough to require all interrogation to stop.  Furthermore, the Court doesn’t apply precedently correctly when they force a person in custodial interrogation that wants an attorney to "unambiguously request for counsel…he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”   Furthermore, this Court slaps precedent in the face when it dictates that," [w]e decline petitioner's invitation to extend Edwards and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney.”   The rationale the majority offers to support is because it would, "would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity…because it would needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer.”     

The majority is blatantly ignoring precedent that decrees  Miranda is a per se rule and a rigid one.  The majority wants to take a dangerous policy of making semantics a constitutional requirement. For example, would this be an unambiguous request for counsel if a person says "lawyer" and nothing else? Arguably, a reasonable police officer would not be able to tell because the speaker is not saying whether  a lawyer is desired or not. Therefore, this statement would fail under the majority's test. 

Furthermore, this Court had put the burden on the Government to provide safeguards for suspects when in custodial interrogation because the Court was afraid that confessions would not be voluntary without these safeguards. Essentially, the Court diminishes these safeguards because if any request for an attorney is ignored, police could relentlessly pressure the interrogee until the police get what they want, similar to how the FBI manipulated Quinn Rucker to confess to the crime of killing a federal judge in John Grisham's book, The Racketeer.  The FBI relentelsy questioned Quinn for hours and tricked Quinn to confees to the murder of a United States Judge. The conversation between them is as follows  : 

I really want my lawyer,he finally said through clenched teeth. [the FBI Agent] replied, You can do that, Quinn, of course, you can. But Dee Ray and Tall Man are in custody right now, singing like birds, and things are only getting worse. It might be a day or two before your lawyer can get down here. You say the word, and we'll turn your brothers loose and leave them alone. Quinn suddenly snapped and yelled, All right! All right what?All right, I'll do it. 

Consequently, the majority is not following precednent with the holding that they have made today. The Government has the burden of telling the person in custodial interrogation that they have all these rights. Is it that burdensome, and does it impact police investigation by simply requiring the Government to ask, "do you want an attorney?" If the response is no, the police do not face any obstacles to their inquiry. If the answer is yes, the police face no further obstacle than what this Court imposed on them by requiring the safeguard on informing the person in custodial interrogation of their right to an attorney. It is speculative and illogical to say that police would not be able to conduct investigations effectively. One could argue that Miranda put a considerable obstacle on police investigation by requiring the police to inform suspects of their rights. However, police have still been able to solve crimes and obtain confessions despite these obstacles. Therefore, it is implausible that requiring the Government to ask a question when it is not clear whether  the person wants an attorney or not will impede police investigations  any more than Miranda already has and does.   

The principle of [s]tare decisis commands the majority to follow the law that was outlined in Miranda. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right… in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its decisions. " The Court has not overruled Miranda. Therefore, it must follow the precedent more closely.  

As a result, for the reasons articulated above and for the concern of the dangerous precedent this present case will set,  I must respectfully dissent.